A Vexatious Problem Among Many: In Light of the Conflict Between the Fifth and Sixteenth Amendments, Is Taxation an Uncompensated Taking? by Jundt, Mark R. & Pederson, Vernon R.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 84 Number 2 Article 2 
1-1-2008 
A Vexatious Problem Among Many: In Light of the Conflict 
Between the Fifth and Sixteenth Amendments, Is Taxation an 
Uncompensated Taking? 
Mark R. Jundt 
Vernon R. Pederson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jundt, Mark R. and Pederson, Vernon R. (2008) "A Vexatious Problem Among Many: In Light of the 
Conflict Between the Fifth and Sixteenth Amendments, Is Taxation an Uncompensated Taking?," North 
Dakota Law Review: Vol. 84 : No. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol84/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
      
 
A VEXATIOUS PROBLEM AMONG MANY: 
IN LIGHT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FIFTH AND 
SIXTEENTH AMENDMENTS, IS TAXATION AN 
UNCOMPENSATED TAKING? 
MARK R. JUNDT† AND VERNON R. PEDERSON†† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The only two things in life that are certain are Death and Taxes, so the 
popular lamentation goes.  The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States provides that “Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived.”1  As all taxpaying 
Americans know, the government utilizes its powers under the Sixteenth 
Amendment to collect its citizens’ money and utilize it, ideally, for public 
good.  The benefits of taxation are vast and override even the necessity of 
such a system.  The roads we drive on, the public schools that educate us, 
and the government officials that lead us are among the countless direct 
benefactors of the powers given to Congress by the Sixteenth Amendment. 
Despite these praises, there is a contravening clause found in the 
Constitution.  The Fifth Amendment provides in part that “private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”2  Although 
this simple sentence sat mostly dormant for an extended period of time, 
more and more courts are effectively championing its cause within the last 
century.  Its cause is simple: to protect private individuals from bearing the 
burden of many.3 
In analyzing whether taxation is a taking, this article first introduces 
takings jurisprudence generally.4  The article then applies that jurisprudence 
 
 †Mr. Jundt is an attorney licensed in Minnesota and practicing in Minneapolis. 
 ††Justice Pederson is a retired North Dakota Supreme Court Justice.  Prior to joining the 
Court, Justice Pederson spent twenty-one years trying eminent domain cases for the North Dakota 
State Highway Department.  He currently resides in Fargo, ND. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
4. See discussion infra Part II (analyzing the foundation, origins, and purpose of the Takings 
Clause). 
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to the topic of taxation.5  Finally, the article analyzes the nuances of 
taxation as a possible taking, along with suggested solutions.6 
II. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Takings Clause is a simple sentence, the poetic prose of which has 
baffled scholars, lawyers, and judges for several centuries.  The language is 
seemingly straightforward: “nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”7  To the Congress which enacted this 
Amendment, their intention was likely obvious.  As time dusted over the 
wording and the legislators long since passed on, the meaning became not 
as simple as it originally seemed.  Questions that typically arise challenge 
the meaning of nearly every word.  What is a “taking”?  Must it be actual?  
Physical?  Total?  What constitutes private property?  Did Congress intend 
only land?  What about personal property?  And finally, could even certain 
rights be considered private property? 
To be clear, there is a lot at stake when analyzing the government’s 
power to take private property.  Even when the government takes only a 
portion of an individual’s property, the results can be exceptionally detri-
mental.  It has been said that “the government does not simply take a single 
‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property rights: it chops through the bundle, 
taking a slice of every strand.”8  The government’s taking of even a portion 
of an individual’s property is such a detrimental event because it effectively 
deprives the individual of all his or her property rights.9  When the govern-
ment permanently occupies physical property, “the owner has no right to 
possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the 
 
5. See discussion infra Part III (analyzing taxation, specifically in light of the requirements of 
the Takings Clause). 
6. See discussion infra Part IV. As a qualifying caveat, there is very little on this subject in 
published existence.  Whether it is the complexity of the issue or the vexatious public nature of the 
problem, a mere three articles were turned over during the research of this topic.  All three articles 
are referenced herein.  Due to the scarcity of academic (and judicial, for that matter) review on 
this subject, many of the findings in this work are theoretical conclusions drawn by the authors 
and applied via current takings jurisprudence.  As an additional note, the reader should keep in 
mind that this topic was chosen and researched in a purely academic setting.  The title and topic of 
this paper do not reflect any aspect of the writers’ political or ideological views.  Aside from 
arguments regarding the amount and appropriation of taxes, taxation—no matter how justified—is 
a foundational aspect of democracy, and thus is necessary regardless of the burdens borne by each 
citizen.  This paper goes to great lengths to embody the non-monetary results of taxation vis-à-vis 
an orderly, democratic society. 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
8. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (quoting 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)). 
9. See id. (“Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights ‘to possess, 
use and dispose of it.’” (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 
(1945))). 
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occupier from possession and use of the space.”10  This power, the power to 
exclude, “has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured 
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”11  Additionally, “the per-
manent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power 
to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can 
make no nonpossessory use of the property.”12  Furthermore: 
[E]ven though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose 
of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation 
of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any 
value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of 
the property.13 
It is clear that the government’s taking of private property is not a matter to 
be taken lightly. 
To effectively determine, however, whether a particular governmental 
action is a taking, it is first necessary to define the fundamental purpose of 
the Takings Clause.  The purpose is to prevent the government from “forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”14  Essentially the 
Takings Clause is a fairness measure; another check or balance to further 
protect citizens from the powers of the government.  It may be properly 
viewed “as a means of encouraging work, saving, and investment by pro-
viding security for the fruits of economic endeavors.”15 
It is true that “[t]o permit government destruction of privately created 
values . . . is to discourage the work and saving and investment that created 
those values.”16  If the pride in the individual ownership of the fruits of 
labor and investment is taken away, then what point is there in exerting 
such efforts?  Along the lines of this analysis, the Takings Clause could be 
argued to serve an economic purpose as well.  The protection of the prop-
erty of private individuals would ensure the security of such property and 
would thus encourage and facilitate further investment and savings.17 
 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 435-36 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); 
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 7 (1936)). 
12. Id. at 436. 
13. Id. 
14. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
15. William K. Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1, 8 (1995) [hereinafter Confiscation]. 
16. Id. at 23. 
17. Id. at 8. 
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It is also important, in determining whether a particular governmental 
action is a taking, to define what the Takings Clause is not.  It is not a com-
plete bar of the government’s possession of previously private property.  
The Takings Clause does not prohibit or restrain the government from 
utilizing its power to take private property for public use.18  Instead, it 
merely “places a condition on the exercise of that power.”19  It is generally 
agreed, and courts have consistently held, that “[t]he Fifth Amendment does 
not proscribe the taking of property; it [merely] proscribes taking without 
just compensation.”20 
In summation, the Takings Clause identifies the boundary of the gov-
ernment’s power of eminent domain, but does not prohibit this power.21  It 
requires that if the government takes private property for public use, the 
individual owners are to be justly compensated for their loss, so those indi-
viduals do not unjustly bear a public burden by themselves.22  The clause 
“stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of governmental power.”23 
Sometimes the most difficult questions are those concerning “just 
compensation.”  What is just compensation?  How should it be calculated?  
Is the mere physical value of the property appropriate?  How about the busi-
ness within its walls, if applicable?  What about goodwill?  Since the Fifth 
Amendment was codified in 1791, these questions have baffled lawyers, 
clogged courts, and caused more than one law student to pull out his or her 
hair. 
III. TAKINGS ANALYSIS VIS-À-VIS TAXATION 
For over a century, courts have recognized the contravening nature of 
the power to collect taxes and the Takings Clause.24  In the late nineteenth 
century, the Court of Appeals of New York stated that “[t]he right of 
taxation and the right of eminent domain rest substantially on the same 
 
18. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 
19. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 
(1987). 
20. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. 
21. Id. 
22. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
23. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980). 
24. See People ex rel Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 424 (N.Y. 1851) (analyzing 
the constitutionality of a local assessment to landowners for the improvements to a street to which 
they were adjacent, and in holding that the assessment was an appropriate usage of the tax powers 
of the government, stating that “[p]rivate property may be constitutionally taken for public use in 
two modes:  that is to say, by taxation and by right of eminent domain” (emphasis in original)); 
People ex rel Post v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 6 Barb. 209, 209 (N.Y. Ch. 1849) (stating that the issues 
of taxation and the taking of private property “appear to be somewhat blended”). 
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foundation.”25  A few years earlier, addressing a similar issue, the court had 
cemented this similarity, stating “it is by no means easy to trace the divid-
ing line between the two.”26 
Customarily, takings analysis directly follows the wording of the 
Takings Clause. Therefore, it is appropriate to determine first whether tax 
affects a taking of private property.27  Next, it must be determined whether 
the taking is for a public purpose.28  The final question to ponder is whether 
there is just compensation.29 
A. DOES TAXATION “TAKE” PROPERTY? 
“[N]or shall private property be taken . . .” 
  
The “taking” of property can be summarized into two general types: (1) 
per se takings and (2) regulatory takings.  Per se takings occur in situations 
when the government has done something which completely deprives the 
individual owners of a portion, or all, of their property.30  Per se takings 
typically embody a more simple analysis.  The government has taken com-
plete control over formerly private property.  The courts have strictly ap-
plied this analysis, even in situations where the property that was taken was 
minimal.31  A generic example of a per se taking is where the government 
wants to make way for a railroad or interstate.  The government “takes” all 
of the property within the path of the road, and therefore compensation is 
due. 
Over time, the courts have broadened the application of the Fifth 
Amendment to situations where there may not be a physical invasion, per 
 
25. Griffin, 4 N.Y. at 422. 
26. Post, 6 Barb. at 214. 
27. See discussion infra Part III.A (analyzing whether taxation actually “takes” property). 
28. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing whether that which taxation funds is a “public 
use”). 
29. See discussion infra Part III.C (examining whether that which a taxpayer receives in 
return for tax dollars may be considered “just compensation”). 
30. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871).  Acting under state statutes, the 
Green Bay Company constructed a dam that caused the river to overflow and inundate the plain-
tiff’s farm upstream.  Id. at 177.  The Court found that the flooding acted as a completed destruc-
tion of the value of the land, and therefore concluded that the land was taken from the plaintiff as 
a result of the statute which allowed such dam construction.  Id. at 181.  The Court ruled “that 
where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other 
material, or by having an artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its 
usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution.”  Id. 
31. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 420 (1982).  A New 
York statute required landlords to permit local cable companies to maintain cable facilities on 
their premises in order to provide service to local tenants.  Id. at 421.  The rooftop space required 
for the equipment was only a few feet at most, but the Court found that a taking occurred via the 
statute requiring the landlord to allow the cable companies this space.  Id. at 441. 
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se, but where the ownership rights of the property owner are infringed upon 
to the point where the owner is deprived of all “use and enjoyment” of the 
property.32  Courts have found a taking to exist even when the landowner 
still retains the right to possess the property.33  Such a taking is known as a 
regulatory taking. 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon34 brought about the birth of modern 
day regulatory takings.  Regulatory takings exist in situations where the 
government institutes some regulation, which effectively deprives the land-
owner of certain rights in the ownership of their property.35  In 
Pennsylvania Coal, the court solidified the breadth of the Fifth Amendment 
by holding that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”36  The courts 
waiver as to what specifically needs to be deprived.  However, courts have 
found that even the deprivation of reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions may be protected.37 
The first step in determining whether taxation constitutes a taking is to 
determine whether money is “private property”38 within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment.  Although the most probable original intent of Congress 
was in reference to the taking of real property, as early as the late nineteenth 
century compensable takings were found when the government seized 
 
32. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 864 n.14 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
33. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946).  Plaintiffs owned a piece of land 
near an airport where they lived and raised chickens.  Id. at 258.  Military aircraft from the nearby 
airport passed overhead at such low altitudes that it caused noise and glare to the point that 
plaintiffs had to abandon their chicken farm.  Id. at 259.  The noise and glare also resulted in 
sleeplessness and anxiety.  Id.  The court awarded compensation for diminution in value, finding 
that the government had taken an “easement of flight.”  Id. at 261. 
34. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
35. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
36. Id.  The Pennsylvania Coal Company executed a deed in 1878, which conveyed title to 
the surface of the property but reserved the right to remove all of the coal.  Id. at 412.  In 1921, the 
State of Pennsylvania enacted the Kohler Act, which forbade the mining of coal in such a way as 
to cause subsistence of any structure used as a human habitation.  Id. at 412-13.  The statute 
required columns of coal to be left below in order to prevent subsistence of the surface above.  Id. 
at 413.  The statute admittedly destroyed Pennsylvania Coal’s previously existing rights to all of 
the coal below the surface.  Id.  The Court found that the regulation had “gone too far” and there-
fore the company was owed just compensation.  Id. at 415-16. 
37. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992).  The plaintiff had purchased 
two parcels of land in which he intended to build homes.  Id. at 1006-07.  Subsequent to the 
plaintiff’s purchase the State of South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management Act, South 
Carolina Code Section 48-39-250, which barred the landowner from erecting any permanent 
habitable structures on his two parcels, thus destroying most of the value that the land held prior to 
the regulation.  Id. at 1007.  The Court ruled for the landowner, holding that the effect of the 
regulation on the value of the land was relevant.  Id. at 1031-32. 
38. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 422 (N.Y. 1851) (“Money is property.”) 
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tangible personal property.39  Over time, the protection of personal property 
under the Fifth Amendment has found increased support, leading scholars 
to note: “[T]he protection of personal property against seizure or 
destruction parallels the protection afforded to real property.”40 
While money is personal property, courts have gone further to recog-
nize money also as a protected property interest, finding that even interest 
earned in bank accounts “is the ‘private property’ of the owner of the prin-
cipal.”41  The Supreme Court found that the retention of interest accrued on 
money placed with the clerk of the circuit court pending distribution to 
creditors was a taking in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith.42  
In Webb, a statute allowed the clerk of the circuit court to place funds that it 
was holding in interest bearing accounts and to retain the interest accrued as 
payment for services rendered.43  Plaintiffs, who were entitled to the distri-
bution of the money, contested that they should be allowed the benefit of 
the interest accrued, and that keeping it was a taking by the circuit court.44  
The Court held that the retention of the interest was in fact a taking, and 
that “services rendered” did not constitute sufficient compensation.45 
In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington46 the Court further sup-
ported the idea that interest accrued in an account may be “‘property’ of the 
owner of the principal.”47  In Brown, the State of Washington created an 
interest-bearing trust account, which allowed lawyers to place money in an 
interest-bearing trust for their clients.48  The interest generated, however, 
was kept by the state and transferred to charitable organizations offering 
legal services to the poor.49  The Court found no taking because the pro-
gram at issue “create[d] income where there had been none before, and the 
income thus created would never benefit the client under any set of 
circumstances.”50 
Even upon the determination that money is private property within the 
meaning of the Takings Clause, the issue is still not rested.  An element of 
 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 631-32 (1871) (holding that the 
temporary seizure of river steamers for military purposes was found to be a taking). 
40. Confiscation, supra note 15, at 26. 
41. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998). 
42. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980). 
43. Id. at 155-56. 
44. Id. at 159 n.5. 
45. Id. at 164-65. 
46. 538 U.S. 216 (2003). 
47. Brown, 538 U.S. at 220 (quoting Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172). 
48. Id. at 220-21. 
49. Id. at 221-23. 
50. Id. at 226. 
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the takings analysis is that, that which is taken be “a specific, non-fungible 
asset.”51  A fungible52 asset is an asset that is non-unique (i.e., replaceable).  
Thus, a non-fungible asset is a specific, unique asset (i.e., a piece of land).  
In almost every case the classification of property as a non-fungible asset is 
nothing more than a cursory thought.  This is because, ordinarily when 
property is taken—whether personal or real—it is nearly always a specific 
asset (for example, thirty acres of land or a car dealership).  Money repre-
sents a unique case, however, because it is not necessarily a “specific asset” 
which is taken via taxation, but is instead a type of asset.  When an individ-
ual is required to pay a tax,53 the requirement is that a specific dollar 
amount be paid.  The requirement does not, however, identify a specific 
source from which the dollar amount must be paid.54  Therefore, when the 
requirement provides that a specific dollar amount is owed, it can be paid 
from any number of sources out of the general assets of the taxpayer.55 
Considering the above argument, tax may not be a taking because it 
does not require a specific, non-fungible asset.  In fact, the asset is highly 
fungible.  One dollar can be replaced with any other, and those dollars will 
be exactly the same.56  In opposition to this argument, money may be found 
to be a specific, non-fungible asset because of the source requirements in-
herent in most tax laws: income tax requires payment from specific money 
earned while working, sales tax is charged upon the sale or purchase of a 
specific item, and inheritance tax is charged upon the dollar amount 
inherited. 
Additionally, perspective is an important consideration.  If, instead of 
classifying that which is owed for taxes as “money” the classification was 
labeled “assets,” the analysis would change.  With respect to assets, money 
becomes a specific, non-fungible item.  One could not use clothing to pay 
for groceries, or buy a car with household goods.  A television could not be 
 
51. Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens 
Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 198 (2002). 
52. Fungible means “1) being of such a nature that one part or quantity may be replaced by 
another equal part or quantity in the satisfaction of an obligation <oil, wheat, and lumber are 
fungible commodities>. 2) interchangeable.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fungible  (last visited May 16, 2008). 
53. It does not matter which type of tax is at issue, whether sales, income, or property tax. 
54. For example, “United States Dollars, serial numbers X through Y.” 
55. The IRS does not care with which dollars you pay your taxes, just that you pay the dollar 
amount owed. 
56. Theoretically, the only type of money that may be non-fungible would be collector’s 
edition money (e.g., old coins) because they have an intrinsic value separate from their stated 
original value.  For example, a Buffalo nickel is certainly worth more than five cents, and no two 
are alike.  Therefore, while technically still currency, they are still highly non-fungible. 
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mailed to the electric company to pay the electric bill.  Therefore, the 
requirement of monetary payment (dollars and cents) is arguably specific. 
The issue of whether the asset is specific and non-fungible is merely an 
element of the takings analysis.  It is not enough to conclude the analysis on 
this single factor.  With the determination that personal property has a 
parallel protection to real property under the Fifth Amendment and the 
knowledge that money is personal property, the issue of whether taxation is 
a taking is likely resolved.  Via the powers given to Congress under the 
Sixteenth Amendment, taxes are collected through several different avenues 
such as income tax, property tax, sales tax, and excise tax.  Through the 
powers granted by the Sixteenth Amendment, the government physically 
takes a portion of each taxpayer’s assets, effectively absolving them of all 
of their rights, ownership, and use in the assets. 
Following the determination that money’s classification is property, it 
is important to analyze the proportion of what is taken, in comparison to a 
benchmark.  Since taxation does not take all of a citizen’s money, it is 
necessary to determine how much is taken.  Taking too high a percentage 
would have the effect of a full taking; too low a percentage equates to a less 
likely chance that a taking would be found.57 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counsel,58 the Supreme Court first 
introduced the analysis that courts should use when considering this issue.59  
The court labeled the analysis the “denominator” problem.60  In the denomi-
nator problem, a percentage calculation is determined by dividing the 
remaining property value by the value pre-regulation.61 
In Lucas, petitioner purchased two beachfront lots in South Carolina 
for $975,000.62  Petitioner intended to develop the lots by building single-
family homes as the owners of adjacent plots had done.63  There were no 
regulations at the time of the petitioner’s purchase to bar such plans.64  In 
1988, however, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront 
Management Act, which effectively barred petitioner’s plans.65  Upon 
appeal the Court reversed and remanded, found that a taking had occurred, 
and asserted that in order for South Carolina to win its case, it must do 
 
57. Cf.  Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (noting that as much as a 
fifty percent (50%) diminution in value would not, in itself, constitute a taking). 
58. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
59. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
60. Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 1006-07. 
63. Id. at 1007. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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something more than merely state that the petitioner’s use would be 
contrary to public interest; it must prove that the petitioner’s intended use of 
the land is prohibited in some other way, such as by nuisance.66 
In order to calculate the takings “factor” with respect to taxation as 
delineated by the court in Lucas, it is crucial to first determine the classifi-
cation that is to be utilized as pre-regulation value.  There are two outcomes 
to this analysis.  If, as discussed above, the property demanded by the gov-
ernment in the form of taxation is to be defined as “income,” then the 
denominator problem would result in a much higher percentage taken.  For 
example, say an individual makes $100,000 a year and pays $30,000 in 
taxes.  Utilizing “income” as the relevant “denominator,” the calculation 
would be as follows: 
$70,000(income after tax)/$100,000(income before tax) = 70% remaining 
(Therefore, a 30% diminution in value.) 
If, instead, the property paid to the government is defined as a portion 
of net worth, the result would be drastically different.  When “net worth” 
becomes the “denominator,” the ratio of property taken drastically 
diminishes.  For example, assuming the same facts as above ($30,000 in 
taxes paid yearly), and a net worth of $500,000, the calculation would be as 
follows: 
$470,000(net worth after tax)/$500,000(net worth before tax) = 94% remaining 
(Therefore, a 6% diminution in value.) 
Although it is arguable that even a thirty percent (30%) diminution in 
value from the “income” perspective does not equate to a taking worthy of 
just compensation, it is obvious that it is a much more persuasive case in 
comparison to the six percent (6%) diminution that results from the “net 
worth” perspective.  The “denominator problem” illustrates the impact that 
different perspectives have on the eventual takings analysis.  While valuing 
the effect of annual taxation on net worth may result in a de minimus 
diminution in value, valuing the effect of annual taxation on annual income 
results in a completely different effect.  So drastic is the difference, in fact, 
that when applied to the very same facts, one perspective could lead a court 
to find the diminution so minor as to not be classified as a taking, while the 
other perspective could lead that very same court to a completely different 
result.  Therefore, as the denominator problem further illustrates, the 
perspective utilized in classifying that which is taken is a key component of 
the takings analysis.  Assuming arguendo that the “income” perspective is 
 
66. Id. at 1031-32. 
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persuasive as the appropriate denominator, a thirty percent (30%) diminu-
tion in value does equate to a taking under modern takings jurisprudence, 
the analysis continues in order to determine whether a valid public use 
exists, and if just compensation has been paid. 
B. IS THERE A PUBLIC USE? 
“. . . for public use . . .” 
 
In order to exercise the power to take property, it is assumed that the 
government must take the property for a public use.  The entire point of 
taxation is to provide the public with services.  Common knowledge shows 
that the government utilizes tax dollars to provide public facilities, build 
and maintain roads, provide police and fire protection, fund social 
programs, and pay for the governance itself. 
What becomes more of an issue, however, is what occurs when tax 
dollars are used to subsidize certain projects that arguably benefit only a 
select section of the population.  The original language of the Takings 
Clause with respect to “public use” was theoretically set to address this 
issue.  However, the courts’ interpretation of public use has changed over 
time.67  The interpretation has always been between a narrow and a broad 
interpretation of public use.68  The narrow view generally “defined public 
use as an actual use by the public.”69  The broad view generally defined 
public use as any use “associated with public advantage, convenience, or 
benefit.”70  The modern courts have essentially sided with the broad inter-
pretation of public use, meaning “virtually every challenged regulation will 
have a colorable public purpose.”71  Although modern courts have generally 
sided with a very liberal interpretation, a definitive line has never been 
drawn. 
Most uses of tax dollars would meet even the narrowest interpretation 
of public purpose.  A large percentage of tax dollars are spent on the fund-
ing of government, the maintenance of roads, and national security.  There 
is no question that these uses are appropriately for public purpose.  The 
question that remains is what is to be said of tax dollars that are utilized for 
the funding of sports stadiums or the subsidization of certain businesses.  
 
67. Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny 
Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 
291 (2000) [hereinafter Trumping Eminent Domain Law]. 
68. Id. at 286. 
69. Id. at 291-92. 
70. Id. at 292. 
71. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1080 (1993). 
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The less directly a public benefit can be eschewed from the use of tax 
dollars, the more apt a court would find that there was not a proper public 
use, and therefore the tax is simply unconstitutional.72 
Considering that a large majority of tax dollars are spent to directly 
serve citizens in one way or another, the issue of public use—narrow or 
broad—is likely to be satisfied.  The most important issue to determine, and 
yet to be discussed, is whether the taxpayer is justly compensated for taken 
property. 
C. IS THERE JUST COMPENSATION? 
“. . . without just compensation.” 
 
Just compensation is the foundational root and purpose of the Takings 
Clause.  The Takings Clause does not prohibit the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain; it merely provides a requirement that when the power is 
exercised, the deprived property owner is compensated.73  Courts have 
boldly stated that there is a “right to recover just compensation for property 
taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of 
eminent domain.  [This] right [is] guaranteed by the Constitution.”74 
Some scholars have explained that “just compensation” is a property 
owner’s insurance against risk.75  The support of this theory is that “private 
insurance is unavailable to protect owners against the possibility of govern-
ment confiscation.  The just compensation requirement provides insurance 
against that risk.”76  This theory echoes the founding principal that just 
compensation, and thus the Takings Clause, “encourage[es] work, 
saving[s], and investment by providing security for the fruits of economic 
endeavors.”77  Imagine a scenario where the government is allowed to 
utilize the powers of eminent domain arbitrarily.  Property owners would 
live in fear that at any time, Uncle Sam could appear at their doorstep with 
an apology, a hug, and a swift boot to the curb, but nothing else.  With this 
constant fear, what would be the driving force to invest, save, or improve 
one’s assets? 
 
72. Trumping Eminent Domain Law, supra note 67, at 289-96. 
73. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 
74. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 
(1987) (quoting Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)). 
75. Confiscation, supra note 15, at 6. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 8. 
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It is important to note that compensation does not have to come in 
monetary form.  The real question is whether the public good, served by the 
tax dollar, effectively equates to just compensation.  In order to determine 
whether this is true, it is necessary to capture that which taxpayers receive 
in return for tax dollars. 
Tax dollars pay for protection such as national security and police and 
fire protection; for governance at the local, state, and federal levels; for 
infrastructure such as roads and waterways; and for the education of a 
majority of citizens through the funding of public schools and universities.  
Tax dollars also take care of the sick and the elderly through programs such 
as Medicare and Medicaid; the poor through welfare; and the disabled 
through disability aids and programs.  Additionally, tax dollars establish an 
entire range of social programs that touch each citizen of this country. 
Arguments are made every day that it is unfair to be taxed for programs 
that certain citizens will never use.  Courts have held, however, that benefits 
are gained simply by the fact that the services are available for use in the 
instance of need.78  In United States v. Sperry Corp.,79 the Court found that 
compensation was not due when the United States had taken two percent of 
tribunal awards granted against the Iranian government.80  The United 
States had established the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to arbitrate 
claims brought by Americans against the government of Iran.81  The two 
percent withheld from the award was intended to pay for the tribunal.82  The 
Court found that the complainant had “benefit[ed] directly from the 
existence and functions of the Tribunal”83 and had essentially received just 
compensation.84  The Court classified the amount taken as a “user fee,” paid 
in exchange for the benefit of the Tribunal.85 
Taxation is analogous to the user fee charged in Sperry.  A percentage 
of a citizen’s assets are taken by the government in order to pay for the 
services that the government provides.  In place of taxes, the government 
could easily charge a “democracy user fee” which would serve the exact 
purposes of the current taxation system.  Some would argue that taxation is 
 
78. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 468 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
79. 493 U.S. 52 (1989). 
80. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 63. 
81. Id. at 55. 
82. Id. at 57. 
83. Id. at 63. 
84. Id. at 64. 
85. Id. at 62. 
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in fact a democracy user fee because taxation, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. once theorized, is essentially like “buying civilization.”86 
Despite the user fee parallel, taxation itself becomes complicated when 
applied to one of the fundamental purposes of the Takings Clause: the 
Takings Clause is meant to protect individuals from bearing a dispropor-
tionate public burden.87  Taxation effectively spreads the burden of paying 
for governmental services throughout the population.  The problem, how-
ever, lies in the disproportionate amount at which individuals pay taxes.  
Consider, for example, the progressive nature of the United States’ income 
tax system.  The higher an individual’s yearly income, the greater percent-
age of that income is taken, and vice versa.  The fundamental flaw in the 
just compensation analysis vis-á-vis taxation, is the determination of 
“value” received in exchange for the increasingly higher tax burden.  For 
example, no one could argue that Bill Gates gets a proportionately greater 
benefit from the government than a poor, starving law student.  Mr. Gates, 
however, pays a vast multiplier more in taxes the amount of the law student.  
In fact, it is arguable that the law student may actually receive a greater 
benefit from the government (via student loans or public schooling) than 
Mr. Gates, at a far lesser cost to the student. 
Theoretically, “gains from government[al] programs should exceed the 
losses such programs inflict.”88  The outcome of the determination of gains 
and losses of governmental programs depends upon perspective.  To 
compare the amount that a student pays in taxes to the proportionate benefit 
received, the gains exceedingly outweigh the losses, as the student likely 
directly benefits from those governmental programs.  However, to compare 
the amount that Bill Gates pays in taxes to the proportionate benefit that he 
receives, the losses appear to tremendously override the gains.  Ignoring the 
independent taxpayer-to-taxpayer results, however, and looking at society 
as a whole, the overall gains arguably exceed the overall losses. 
In Brown, the Court found “that the just compensation require[ment of] 
the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property owner’s loss rather than 
the government’s gain.”89  Under this analysis, the taxes that Bill Gates 
pays may be a taking to the extent that they exceed the benefit that he 
receives.  Some scholars have concluded that only strictly proportional tax 
 
86. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 71 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1961). 
87. See Kades, supra note 51, at 195 (“[T]he primary purpose of the Takings Clause [is] 
avoiding unfair allocation of the burdens of public projects.”). 
88. Confiscation, supra note 15, at 10. 
89. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003). 
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rates, such as a flat percentage irrespective of income levels, satisfy the 
demands of the Takings Clause.90 
Irrespective of the above example, the perspective needs to be that of 
the “big picture” in order for a functioning democracy to subsist.  With this 
analysis, the individual burdens borne by each taxpayer culminate into a 
benefit that outweighs the losses.  Through the aggregation of all services, 
paid for out of a single Treasury, the economies of scale91 allow for a 
cheaper per unit cost than if each would be purchased separately.  
Therefore, in a “total is greater than the sum of all parts” approach, unfair 
allocation of burdens is avoided.  Taxation “couples burdens on a broad 
swath of the population with benefits from the use of tax revenues sprinkled 
over a similarly large portion of society.”92  In contrast, “[t]akings . . . 
burden one or a relatively narrow subset of property owners for projects 
with much wider social benefits.”93 
IV. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Even upon concluding that the Sixteenth Amendment is not in conflict 
with the Fifth Amendment, there may be simple classification changes that 
could be made to more effectively reconcile these two Amendments.  For 
example, it could be useful to implement a local, versus federal, tax.  
Finally, it would be effective to employ a broader expansion of the usage of 
“special assessments.” 
A. LOCAL VERSUS FEDERAL TAX 
It is not contested that the purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent a 
small number of individuals from bearing the burden of the public as a 
whole.94  Under this purpose, an all-encompassing local tax (state or 
regional) may more effectively meet the financial needs of a nation.  
Furthermore, this local tax would not cross the lines drawn by takings 
jurisprudence. 
 
90. See generally Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3 (1986) 
(examining, in part, “large numbered takings”). 
91. “Economies of scale” is defined as a “reduction in cost of production due to a large 
number of items produced.”  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com (last visited May 2, 2008). 
92. Kades, supra note 51, at 203. 
93. Id. 
94. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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Imagine the 635,000 citizens of the state of North Dakota95 paying for 
an equal share of the national services that the United States Government 
offers.  Further imagine the disproportionate nature of the tax dollars spent 
in comparison to the services received.  In contrast, imagine the 36 million 
citizens of the state of California,96 also paying for an equal share of the 
services that the government offers.  To wrap oneself around this argument, 
it is necessary to look at the individual North Dakota and California citizen.  
If each citizen is of equal income class, each will pay the same amount in 
federal taxes.  The California citizen, however, gets much more “bang for 
their buck”; they have the benefit of the availability of many more 
programs, the effect of many more services, and even are provided with 
more interstates on which to drive.  The benefit that the California citizen 
receives is arguably much greater than the individual burden.  The North 
Dakota citizen, on the other hand, has fewer governmental programs 
available.  However, the North Dakota citizen continues to pay the same 
amount of money, paying proportionate tax for disproportionate benefits. 
The argument above is flawed, however, because to look at taxation in 
a regional sense takes away the “requirement” aspect of taxation as a 
burden.  North Dakota citizens may freely move to California, for example, 
and receive more for their tax dollars.  In order to more effectively level the 
playing field, and in an attempt to institute regional fairness, all federal tax 
could be substituted for a state tax alone.  Under this system, the cost of the 
aggregate services offered could be divided up by each state and charged in 
a proportionate nature to each citizen of a state based upon that state’s 
access to services divided by its population.  The result may go towards 
alleviating disproportionate burdens and the use of a fair ratio.  The pendu-
lum could thus swing more towards equilibrium by allowing a greater 
portion of taxpayers to receive “just compensation” for their tax dollars. 
B. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS 
Typically, special assessments are levied upon property owners within 
a certain area that would directly benefit from a particular project.97  Special 
assessments usually pay for local streets or neighborhood projects.98  While 
the burden is spread over relatively few individuals, the benefit is also very 
 
95. U.S. Census Bureau—North Dakota, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/38000.html 
(last visited May 16, 2008). 
96. U.S. Census Bureau—California, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last 
visited May 16, 2008). 
97. Kadzban v. City of Grandville, 502 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Mich. 1993). 
98. Id. at 302. 
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specific.99  The property owners pay for improvements to their specific 
neighborhoods.100  Theoretically, the benefit may be classified as monetary 
in nature via an increased property value.  Irrespective of this fact, special 
assessments more effectively allocate burdens only to individuals that 
ideally are directly benefiting from them.101 
It is easy to see that special assessments are likely not uncompensated 
takings due to the specific nature of their benefits and burdens.  The special 
assessments may constitute a taking with respect to the deprivation of a 
certain dollar amount, but they provide compensation that is more than 
adequate in the form of a direct benefit derived.  With respect to special 
assessments, there exists a direct burden-to-benefit link.  The compensation 
outcome is typically overwhelming.  The thousand dollars that a home 
owner pays in special assessments pales in comparison to the wider, well-lit 
street that is received in return. 
Although conceptually impossible to administer due to the sheer size 
and scope of government programs and expenditures, special assessments 
would be the best way to constitutionally levy taxes.  A possible hybrid of 
the two systems above may work, however, whereby all federal services 
such as military and governance (services which affect all citizens equally) 
could be divided commensurately among all citizens.  Meanwhile, all other 
services could be funded locally or regionally to ensure a more direct 
benefit received by those citizens. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Taxation is a necessary evil; it is a burden and a taking.  Taxation is 
not, however, unconstitutional.  The Fifth Amendment requires that if the 
government takes private property for public use, the government pays for 
it.102  Looking at the nation as a whole, the overall benefit derived pays for 
the burden that each individual taxpayer bears.  Through a combination of 
social benefit and economies of scale, the taxation system burdens some 
while benefiting all.  And, by leveraging each individual’s tax dollars via 
volume, the taxation system garners a higher output than would otherwise 
be possible. 
Imagine instead of paying all of your taxes last year (e.g., income tax 
or sales tax) you attempted to personally pay for the services provided by 
the government and typically funded by tax dollars.  How much military 
 
99. Id. (citing Kuick v. Grand Rapids, 166 N.W.2d 979 (Mich. 1918)). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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could you fund?  How much highway could you personally pay for in a 
year?  By aggregating each individual tax burden, a result is obtained that is 
greater than the sum of the individual burdens.  Therefore, the benefit out-
weighs the burden, and the taking effectuated by the Sixteenth Amendment 
is justly compensated. 
Realistically, the “big picture” is the only perspective that does democ-
racy justice.  Therefore, it is exceedingly adequate to utilize this perspective 
when analyzing the takings issue.  Under this perspective, the burden that 
each individual suffers is paid back tenfold in the form of an orderly and 
just society with functional programs and adequate services.  As Justice 
Holmes once stated, “[t]axes are what we pay for [a] civilized society.”103  
The burden each individual suffers, be it Bill Gates the Entrepreneur or Phil 
Gates the Law Student, is more than adequately compensated by the overall 
benefit received. 
 
 
103. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 
87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
